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ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION REVISITED
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BLUM
Douglas A. Kahn*t
Professor Blum's comment' addresses the proper or neutral tax
treatment to be accorded three of the items discussed in my recent
article2 on accelerated depreciation - namely, annuities, prepaid ex-
penses, and exhaustible assets. Blum disputes my analysis in all
three cases. While Blum's article is eminently readable, I do not be-
lieve that it refutes my earlier work to any extent. In this reply to
Professor Blum, I will deal separately with each of the three items he
examines. First, however, it is useful to consider the meaning of the
term "tax neutrality" and to set forth my views as to the nature and
proper function of the neutrality principle.
A tax provision is neutral if it is compatible with some "correct"
or "ideal" definition of net income. Where a tax provision fails to
conform to a particular commentator's notion of an ideal income
tax, that commentator says it provides a tax preference or a tax sub-
sidy to those persons who benefit from it. Such subjective tax prefer-
ences often are called "tax expenditures." A neutral provision is one
that does not generate a tax expenditure.
Much of the literature on tax neutrality treats the issue as an all
or nothing proposition. Relying on some variation of the much dis-
cussed Haig-Simons definition of income, commentators conclude
that a tax provision either is tax neutral or is not. My view of neu-
trality is more relativistic. One of the points of my recent article is
that there is no single ideal (or correct) definition of net income for
income tax purposes. Rather, the determination of net income rests
on value judgments that not all people share and that change over
time as societal values change. Instead of a rigid, narrow concept
bordered by fine, clear lines, net income can be viewed as a concept
defined by broad and changing boundaries. Any tax treatment con-
sistent with such a broadly defined concept of net income can be
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1955, University of North Carolina;
J.D. 1958, George Washington University. - Ed.
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1. Blum, Accelerated Depreciatiorn A Proper Allowancefor Measuring Net Income?/, 78
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2. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowancefor Measuring
Net Income? 78 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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considered to be within the zone of tax neutrality. Under this expan-
sive view, a variety of different tax treatments of a single transaction
can qualify as tax neutral because they can all lie within the neutral
zone. In some cases, Congress permits a taxpayer to elect among
several tax neutral provisions - to choose, for example, among sev-
eral permissible methods of depreciation.
Once it is determined that several proposed tax treatments are tax
neutral, the choice of one over the others, or the choice of whether to
adopt any or all of them, is made by weighing economic, political,
and social policy considerations. For example, there are substantial
grounds for characterizing medical expense deductions and casualty
and theft loss deductions as tax neutral, although these deductions
often are classified as tax expenditures. A neutral characterization,
however, does not compel the allowance of deductions for those
items. While consistency with tax neutrality weighs in favor of
granting a deduction, the decision to allow or to deny deductions
ultimately rests on broader policy considerations. As a result, the tax
law forbids many deductions that, nevertheless, would be consistent
with tax neutrality. The clearest example is the § 162(c) denial of a
deduction for unlawful business expenses.3 Another example is the
failure to grant a tax deduction for liabilities incurred for causing
damages to others in a nonbusiness setting (this is admittedly more
controversial, for many persons would not deem such a deduction to
be tax neutral).
The zone of tax neutrality can be divided into concentric sub-
zones of differing proximity to the core of the net income concept.
For example, a deduction for most types of business expenses is
more essential to determining net income than is a deduction for the
cost of tax consultations. The closer a particular tax provision is to
the essence of the net income concept, the greater the presumption in
favor of adopting that provision. Thus, the weight of negative policy
considerations required to justify rejecting a tax neutral provision is
not the same for all such provisions. A slight negative factor may
suffice to reject provisions falling near the boundaries of the net in-
come concept, but such negative factors should be quite substantial
to warrant rejecting provisions that are integral to the net income
concept. Some tax provisions lie within the hazy zone at the borders
of neutrality; no affirmative or negative weight should be accorded
these provisions on the basis of their purported neutrality or non-
neutrality. Where a tax provision falls outside the broadly defined
3. I.R.C. § 162(c).
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zone of neutrality, it nevertheless may be proper to adopt it if policy
considerations warrant it, but the contravention of tax neutrality is a
negative factor to be weighed against adopting such a provision.
There must be stronger policy grounds for adopting a tax provision
that contravenes tax neutrality than otherwise would be required.
In my view, considerably fewer tax provisions contravene tax
neutrality principles than are listed as tax expenditures in the budg-
ets drawn by several governmental units. Accelerated depreciation
is merely one example of the overreaching of such lists. It is note-
worthy that Professor Blum also views the tax expenditure concept
as "political rhetoric." That is not to say, of course, that Professor
Blum concurs with my statements concerning the nature and signifi-
cance of the tax neutrality principle. I hope to expand on those
views of tax neutrality in a later article. As we shall see, however
one views the tax neutrality principle, the allowance of an acceler-
ated cost recovery for annuity payments, prepaid expenses, and espe-
cially for accelerated depreciation, does not contravene that
principle.
Annuities. My recent article states that the purchase of a single
annuity for years is equivalent to the purchase of a number of sepa-
rate contracts, each of which represents the right to a stated dollar
amount at a specified future date.4 The article further contends that
the part of each annuity payment made to the purchaser which con-
stitutes a return of his capital (i e., his cost recovery) is equal to the
amount that he paid for that segment of the annuity contracts. So,
taking the three-year annuity paying a dollar per year to which Blum
refers, the annuitant paid 94¢ for the dollar he receved in Year One,
and thus only 6¢ of that dollar is income to him. Similarly, the an-
nuitant paid 840 for the dollar he received in Year Three, and thus
16¢r of that dollar is income to him.
While I believe that the above-described treatment is the most
accurate representation of economic reality, my article acknowledges
that a colorable claim can be made for treating an annuity purchase
as a single investment, and for allocating all accrued interest to each
annuity payment.5 However, my article disputes the contention
(which Blum reasserts) that such an allocation is the only reporting
method that comports with tax neutrality. As to the choice between
reporting a declining and an increasing amount of interest, the arti-
cle shows that the case for crediting lesser amounts of interest (ie.,
4. Kahn, supra note 2, at 22-25.
5. Id. at 25.
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allocating more cost recovery) in the earlier years of the annuity con-
tract is overwhelming.6 No insights in Professor Blum's piece appear
to warrant a change of that view. For convenience, later in this
Comment, I will sometimes refer to the method of income and cost
recovery allocation advocated by my recent article as an "accelerated
cost recovery method."
Blum makes two points in his attempt to establish that there is an
absence of tax neutrality in allocating increasing amounts of interest
to annuity receipts and conversely in allocating decreasing amounts
of cost recovery to such payments. First, he points out that it is
"highly unrealistic to assume that a single annuity contract for three
years is equivalent to three separate contracts for one year each.''
7
As we shall see, that may be something of an overstatement. Blum
correctly states that the prevailing interest rate for a three-year loan
will not necessarily equal the interest rate for a one-year loan. This
difference arises primarily because the parties involved will build
into the long-term rate their view of the likelihood that interest rates
will increase or decrease over that period. Thus, if the prevailing
rate for a one-year loan is six percent, and if the market indicates
that the rate is likely to increase in the next several years, the rate of
interest for a three-year loan will be greater than six percent. The
rate of return is increased to compensate the lender for the risk that
his money will be committed to an investment at a lower rate of
return than would otherwise be available. Conversely, if the market
indicates that interest rates will be lowered in the next several years,
the interest rate payable on a three-year loan will likely be less than
the current one-year rate of six percent. Apart from the anticipation
of interest rate changes, other market factors can influence the rate
on long-term loans. For example, because the lender's funds are
committed for a longer period (and, therefore, unavailable for him to
consume), and because a long-term loan entails a greater risk of de-
fault, the interest rate on long-term loans may be greater than that
on short-term loans. Blum opines that a "similar diversity of interest
rates might be expected to prevail in pricing term annuities that start
at different dates."8
Accepting Blum's assumption that the discount rates for annui-
ties will be determined in the same fashion as are interest rates for
long-term loans,9 annuity payments still will bear less interest in the
6. Id.
7. Blum, supra note 1, at 1176.
8. Id.
9. For commercial annuities, this may not always be the case. A commercial annuity (e.,
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early years of the contract than in later years. The purchase price of
an annuity yielding a dollar per year for three years will be the sum
of the costs of purchasing three separate contractual rights - the
right to a dollar one year hence, a dollar two years hence, and a
dollar three years hence. While the discount rates for the right to an
annuity payment for each of those years will not necessarily be iden-
tical, the total cost for the three-year contract must equal the sum of
the costs for each separate year (with perhaps some reduction for
economies of scale, Le., the savings of cost for clerical and selling
expenses).
The issuer of an annuity is unlikely to compute the cost of each
year's annuity payment separately. Rather, it will apply a single dis-
count rate determined as a weighted average of the discounts for
each of the separate years. A single weighted discount rate is admin-
istratively easier to apply than separate rates for each year, but the
net result is merely a short-cut method of determining the aggregate
cost of the several segments of an annuity contract.
In sum, the cost of rights to future annuity payments will reflect
the risk that interest rates will change during the contract period.
But the fact that interest rates affect the cost of rights of future pay-
ments does not alter the proposition that the net cost of an annuity
contract is equal to the aggregate costs of its segments. The question
then becomes whether the possible application of different discount
rates is inconsistent with an accelerated rate of recovery of capital.
If the discount rate for a right to a payment three years hence is
greater than the discount rate for a right to a payment only one year
hence, the proportion of capital recovery to be allocated to Year One
is even greater than it would be if the discount rates for Years One
an annuity contract sold by a person who is in the business of writing and selling such con-
tracts) sometimes provides a guaranteed rate of interest sufficiently low that there is no mean-
ingful risk that it will be greater than the prevailing current rate in any year in which the policy
is in effect. The contract provides for the risk of a rise in interest rates by adjusting the aggre-
gate amount payable to the annuitant to reflect the proper current interest rate. This is done
by increasing either the amount or the number of the periodic payments made to the annui-
tant. For example, an annuity contract might guarantee payments of a specified amount com-
puted at a four percent interest rate for a specified period. If the proper return for a given year
of the contract (as determined by market conditions) is six percent, the additional two percent
of interest will be paid to the annuitant. Of course, any amount paid to an annuitant in excess
of the guaranteed payment constitutes interest income and should be so treated. Since this
method of adjusting interest rates is not a uniform practice, especially among private annuities,
I accept Blum's premise that discount rates for annuities will probably be determined in the
same manner as are interest rates on loans, and I will deal directly with Blum's contention that
such a treatment negates the analysis employed in my article. In any event, I am virtually
compelled to adopt Blum's premise on this matter since the type of annuity contract I dis-
cussed in my article was not the adjusting interest variety, but rather was a contract to pay
fixed sums at pre-established dates.
June 1980]
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and Three were identical. This means that even less of the first
year's payment would constitute income than would be true under
the accelerated cost recovery pattern that my article espouses. On
the other hand, if the discount rate for the later years of an annuity is
less than the discount rate for the earlier years, a higher proportion
of the total cost of the annuity contract is allocable to the later years
than would be the case if the discount rate was constant, and a
smaller proportion of the cost will be allocated to the earlier years of
the contract payments. Even in that case, it is virtually inconceivable
that the difference in discount rates would be of such magnitude as
to preclude an accelerated cost recovery method; a significantly re-
duced rate for payments due in later years merely reduces the extent
of the acceleration that is proper. Even in the case of an unrealisti-
cally high differential in rates, a substantially greater portion of the
annuitant's cost is allocable to payments made in the early years.' 0
As previously noted, the question of whether the discount rate for
the later years of annuity payments will be less than the discount rate
for the earlier years turns in large measure upon the market's evalua-
tion as to whether rates are more likely to fall than to rise. At any
particular time, the economic indicators may point toward a likely
increase or decrease in interest rates. There is no apparent reason to
believe that, over the long term, investors will expect a decline in
rates more often than they will expect an increase. Unless the dis-
count rates for the later annuity payments are typically substantially
10. A significant variance among discount rates cannot occur unless the term of the loan or
the deferral of the annuity payment is substantial; and the longer the period of deferral of
repayment, the greater the proportion of capital to be allocated to the earlier annuity payments
(or loan installment payments). For example, suppose that the discount rate for an annuity
payment to be made in one year is six percent and the discount rate for a payment to be made
in five years is only three percent. The cost of a one dollar annuity payment to be made one
year hence at a six percent discount is 94.3C. The cost of a one dollar annuity payment to be
made five years hence at a three percent discount is only 86.3C. It is exireme unlikely that the
discount rate for a four-year additional deferral of repayment would be so great - the three
percent rate that is used in this illustration for the five-year deferred annuity payment is only
half of the six percent rate for the one-year deferred payment. Even in that unlikely extreme
circumstance, there is a substantially greater capital cost for the payment received in Year One
than for the payment received in Year Five. Accordingly, an accurate method of reporting
income from such annuity payments would still reflect less income in the early years and
greater income in the later years.
It is significant that since interest rates on annuities typically are relatively low, it is un-
likely that the discount rate for a long-deferred annuity payment will be substantially lower
than the rate for an immediate payment. And the longer the period of deferral, the greater the
acceleration of capital recovery in the early years. For example, if the discount rate for a one
dollar payment one year hence were six percent and the rate for a one dollar payment due ten
years hence were as little as three percent, the cost of the first year's payment would be 94.3¢
and the cost of the tenth year's payment would be 74.4¢ - in other words, assuming level
annuity payments, the amount of capital recovery allocable to the first year's payment is
greater than that allocable to the tenth year's payment by an amount equal to 19.9% of the
payment received in each year.
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less than the discount rates for the earlier annuity payments, the pos-
sibility of differences between short- and long-term rates does not
contravene the accelerated cost recovery analysis. And as demon-
strated earlier, even if long-term discount rates were usually lower
than short-term rates, that difference would only slightly reduce the
acceleration of capital recovery; it would not preclude such accelera-
tion."I Since at any particular moment during a long time interval
the likelihood that the market will anticipate an increase in interest
rates is at least as great as the prospect that it will anticipate a reduc-
tion in rates, it is reasonable to disregard differences between long-
and short-term rates when analyzing the proper breakdown of the
payments received by an annuitant. Because the rate of acceleration
of cost recovery is at least as likely to be increased by applying differ-
entiated discount rates as it is to be reduced, and because the amount
of any differentiation of rates is difficult to ascertain, it is reasonable
to treat the short-term discount rate as a constant - L e., to use the
short-term rate as the effective discount rate for the entire period of
the annuity.
Blum's second reason for rejecting my article's characterization
of annuity payments is that the article's analysis rests on an allegedly
erroneous application of the cash accounting method. Blum asserts
that cash accounting reporting is permitted for two reasons - ad-
ministrative ease and financial convenience - and that neither of
those considerations applies in the case of annuities. As to financial
inconvenience (the burden imposed by taxing a person on income
accrued but not yet available to him), Blum states that
should the annuitant be required to use sinking-fund reporting, he
already would have the dollars in hand that reflect the amount of inter-
est he reports for tax purposes. In the illustration, the 16; interest in
year one resulting from a sinking-fund calculation is amply covered by
the one dollar received by the annuitant at the end of that year. 12
In essence, Blum contends that where there is clear evidence that
a cash method taxpayer has sufficient capital available to pay the
taxes arising from the accrual of income to him, and where the
amount of such income can easily be calculated, the taxpayer should
not be permitted the deferral that attends cash method reporting, but
rather should be compelled to report such income in the year that it
accrues. Referring again to our hypothetical three-year annuity, 94¢
of the dollar collected by the annuitant in Year One was a return of
his own capital and 60 was the income derived from that capital.
11. See note 10 supra.
12. Blum, supra note 1, at 1177.
1191June 1980]
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Blum would not only tax the annuitant on the 60 of income that he
collected but also on the 10¢ of income that had accrued to him be-
cause of the deposit he had made for dollars to be paid to him in
Years Two and Three.
My recent article points out that the economic position of an an-
nuitant who purchases an annuity for a term of years is the same as
if he had purchased a separate contract right for each year of the
annuity term.13 The purpose of that comparison was to demonstrate
the economic reality of the single purchase of a long-term annuity
contract and the receipt of annuity payments thereunder. Blum's as-
sertion that the purchase of three separate contracts presents tax
avoidance issues rests on his premise that the correct method of re-
porting income from a single purchase of a three-year annuity con-
tract is different from the result my article advocated. This begs the
question. Since Blum believes that such a comparison raises tax
avoidance questions, let me set forth a slightly different circumstance
that better serves to illustrate the same point.
Three persons, X, Y, and Z, all of whom report on the cash
method, purchase a nonrefundable annuity from the Friendly Insur-
ance Company. The company determines the cost of the annuity by
discounting at a six percent rate. X purchases the right to receive a
dollar one year hence, and X pays 94¢ for that right. Obviously,
when X receives his dollar at the end of a year, he will have 6 in-
come and the remaining 94¢ will constitute a return of his original
capital investment. Ypurchases the right to a dollar to be paid three
years hence, and Ypays 84¢ for that right.14 Again, it is obvious that
of the dollar that Y receives in Year Three, 16€ represents interest to
him and the remaining 84¢ is a return of his capital investment.
Under current tax practice, which permits cash method rqporting in
such cases, Y will not report any of his interest income until he col-
lects the dollar in Year Three. 15 Z chooses to purchase a contract
13. Kahn, supra note 2, at 24.
14. F& the reasons stated previously, the same discount rate (six percent) is applied to the
right to a payment three years hence as is applied to a one-year deferral. As shown above, the
principle under discussion changes little if different discount rates are applied to each year.
15. It seems unlikely that I.R.C. § 1232 would apply to I's transaction. As noted in Kahn,
supra note 2, at 10 n.42, Congress amended § 1232 in 1969 to require a cash method taxpayer
to accrue annually a pro-rata portion of the original issue discount on corporate bonds or other
corporate evidences of debt. In effect, this provision requires the bondholder (or other corpo-
rate debt holder) to report the accrued interest income attributable to original issue discount.
The stated purpose of that provision was to require parallel reporting of the interest deduction
by the corporation and of the interest income by the bondholder. For that reason, the provi-
sion does not apply to bonds issued by a governmental body since governments do not take tax
deductions. My article questioned why Congress mandated parallel treatment in that one cir-
cumstance when the use of cash and accrual methods by different taxpayers necessarily results
1192 [Vol. 7/8:1185
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right to receive a dollar one year hence and to receive another dollar
three years hence. The cost of that contract right is 94¢ + 84¢ =
$1.78. At the end of Year One, when Z receives his first dollar under
the contract, the portions of that dollar which represent income and
capital surely are the same as they were for X- namely, 60 interest
and 94¢ return of capital. Similarly, the dollar that Z receives in
Year Three has the same economic characteristics as did the dollar
that Y received - 16¢ interest and 840 return of capital.
In the illustration above, at the end of one year the $1.78 that Z
paid to the insurance company will have earned interest equal to six
percent of $1.78, or almost 11¢. Of that 110 of earned interest, 6¢
was actually paid to Z and therefore is taxed to him. Blum would
tax Z on the additional 50 of earned interest that was not paid to Z
(and is not then available to Z) because Z has recovered 940 of his
original capital. Z's recovery of his capital demonstrates that he has
funds available to pay the tax on the 50 of accrued but unreceived
income. Although Congress could conceivably tax Z as Blum sug-
gests, there is no reason to characterize an alternative tax treatment
that conforms with both economic reality and cash method reporting
as lacking neutrality and therefore amounting to a subsidy for Z.
I must emphasize that I am not recommending that annuitants be
taxed in accordance with economic reality - that is, on an ascending
rate of interest income. The current tax law does not operate in that
fashion for good and sufficient policy reasons. I contend only that
current tax practice does not constitute a tax preference for annui-
tants because of its failure to adopt a sinking-fund method of allocat-
ing interest income. Similarly, an accelerated cost recovery method
does not constitute a tax preference to annuitants. So, if Congress
were to permit a cash method annuitant to report only the amount of
cash income that he actually or constructively receives, that method
of reporting would not contravene tax neutrality.
in a lack of parallel treatment in many circumstances. One possible explanation for singling
out corporate bonds and debt instruments is that it was one of a number of actions taken by
Congress in 1969 against the use of debt by conglomerates in taking over small corporations.
In essence, it was an anti-conglomerate step taken for financial and social policy reasons.
While Blum is correct that the purchase of an annuity right for one year (or for that matter, an
annuity for a period of years) is similar to acquiring a debt with an original issue discount, it
appears unlikely that § 1232 will extend to commercial annuities that are specifically dealt
with in a separate Code provision (§ 72). Obviously, on its explicit terms, § 1232 does not
apply to private annuities purchased from individuals. Even if § 1232 did extend to cover § 72
annuities, this would not reflect on the principle at issue - ie., the economic reality of what
portion of an annuity payment represents interest and what portion represents a return of
capital. Congress can require accrual method reporting if it wishes to do so, but that does not
convert a method of reporting that comports with cash method accounting into one that lacks
tax neutrality or constitutes a tax subsidy.
June 1980] 1193
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While Blum may wish to require annuitants to report income
from their annuity contracts on the accrual method, he seems con-
tent to tie their recognition of deferred income to the amount of capi-
tal returned to them in the taxable year in question.' 6 The
annuitant's receipt of a return of his capital is no better reason for
taxing him on earned but unpaid income than is his possession of
cash of an equal amount. In the illustration above, for example, Y
would have earned interest of over 5¢ at the end of Year One on the
84¢ that he paid to the insurance company for the right to one dollar
in Year Three. Under normal cash method reporting, Y will not
report that income until he actually receives the dollar in Year
Three. If it can be shown that Yhas at least 5¢ of cash in his posses-
sion, there is as much reason to tax Y on the accrued income as there
would be to tax Z, who in Year One received a return of some of his
capital in cash. But if a cash method taxpayer were to be taxed on
unreceived but easily computed income whenever he has an equal
amount of cash on hand, there would be little left of the cash report-
ing method. Presumably, Blum would limit his "available cash" rule
to situations where cash was received by the taxpayer in the year in
question from the person who is obligated to pay the accrued income
to the taxpayer at some future date. The desirability of such a rule
seems questionable; in any event it does not negate my article's con-
tention that a cash method annuitant's reporting of only that amount
of income from annuity payments that is actually or constructively
received by him does not violate the principle of tax neutrality.
Prepaid Expenses. Sellers typically allow a price discount for the
prepayment of expenses. As an illustration of such prepayments and
their proper treatment, my article discusses the case of the purchase
of a five-year business fire insurance policy for which the entire pre-
mium is paid in advance.' 7 The article contends that the purchase
price (i e., the entire premium) is set equal to the sum of the dis-
counted values of the premiums for each of the five years. Thus, the
cost of coverage for each year is greater than the cost of coverage for
the immediately succeeding year, and accordingly the deductions for
the business expenditures should be greatest in the first year and
should be reduced in each succeeding year.
Blum disputes this result and states that the analysis "depends on
the assumption that, for tax purposes, the insured never need take
into account the imputed interest for which he is given credit by the
16. See Blum, supra note 1, at 1177.
17. Kahn, supra note 2, at 38-39.
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insurance company in computing prepaid premiums."' 8 My article
treated the annual increase in value of the taxpayer's right to future
fire insurance coverage as unrealized appreciation, and Blum is cor-
rect in pointing out that it might better be characterized as imputed
(or constructive) interest from the insurance company. Nevertheless,
Blum's statement is somewhat puzzling. While my article did not
expressly deal with imputed income, it obviously is reflected in the
amount of the deduction that the article concluded the taxpayer
could appropriately take. The item in question was a deductible ex-
pense. Each year, assuming that the annual increase in value is to be
treated as imputed income, a cash method taxpayer would recognize
income in an amount equal to the difference between $1,000 (the
amount of the premium for that year) 19 and the taxpayer's cost that
is allocated to that year. Since this imputed income would be
deemed to have been expended immediately for the purchase of
business insurance, it would also be deductible and so would wash
out the income item. Whether the taxpayer must report this amount
as income and take a corresponding deduction or whether the tax-
payer can simply exclude this amount from income is an interesting
question; but in either event, the ultimate result is that the taxpayer
will show a net deduction in an amount equal to the prepaid cost
that is allocable to that year's premium payment. I regret having
failed to discuss this matter in my article - I short-circuited the
problem by simply dealing with the deduction of the taxpayer's dol-
lar cost. Nevertheless, the method of analysis I employed in the arti-
cle has built into it a recognition of the imputed income from the
prepayment. Under the article's analysis, imputed income is re-
flected in the taxpayer's tax base whether the taxpayer reports on the
cash or on the accrual method, but the timing of recognition might
be different for an accrual method taxpayer.20
What Professor Blum and I dispute is not whether imputed in-
come will be taken into account; rather it is a question of timing, of
what date imputed income will be taken into account by the tax-
payer's reporting method. This question reduces to precisely the
same dispute that was discussed above in connection with annuities.
18. Blum, supra note 1, at 1178.
19. Although irrelevant to this Comment, it is interesting to ponder whether the taxpayer
would recognize a gain or loss if the cost of fire insurance premiums had risen or fallen at the
time that the prepayment is applied in satisfaction of that premium cost.
20. I was remiss in failing to state in my article that the taxpayer in question reported on
the cash method. If he reported on the accrual method, the result might be different. While
the annual increase in value of the taxpayer's right to fire insurance protection for a future year
is similar to the accrual of interest, I am less than certain that it would be so treated for accrual
method income tax reporting purposes. See Rev. Rul. 65-199, 1965-2 C.B. 20.
1195June 1980]
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Professor Blum wbuld require the reporting of imputed income on
deposits for premium payments for future years. I would not require
the reporting of such income by a cash method taxpayer until the
prepayment is actually applied to the cost of a year's insurance, un-
less the taxpayer has the power to withdraw the accrued "interest" at
some earlier date. In the latter event, the annuitant likely will have
constructively received the "interest" at the time that it is earned. It
is possible that the same timing schedule should apply to accrual
method taxpayers if the annual increase in value of the taxpayer's
interest in the future fire insurance coverage is not so nearly identical
to interest as to warrant its accrual, but that possibility is subject to
'dispute. If the cost of the insurance coverage had been a nondeduct-
ible item, the tax issue arising upon prepayment would be the timing
of the recognition of the imputed income rather than the deductibil-
ity of the cash payment allocable to each year. But that question is
simply the converse of the one under discussion - viz, whether the
amount of imputed income recognized each year will increase or de-
crease. The Internal Revenue Service has announced its position on
this issue, and while the Service's view is not dispositive of the ques-
tion of tax neutrality, it is worth noting. In a 1965 Revenue Ruling,
the Commissioner stated:
Any increment in value of so-called "advance premiums," "prepaid
premiums," or "premium deposit funds" which is applied to the pay-
ment of premiums due on annuity and life insurance policies, or made
available for withdrawal by the policyholder, will result in taxable in-
come to the policyholder at that time.2'
Thus, the Service's position is that, unless there is a power of with-
drawal, the imputed income from a prepayment of nondeductible
insurance premiums is taken into account by the taxpayer in his re-
turn for the year for which the prepayment was applied. That will
result in the recognition of increasing amounts of income each year
where prepayment is made for more than one year's premium. It is
noteworthy that the ruling is not expressly limited to cash method
taxpayers, and makes no mention of different treatment for persons
using other methods of accounting. The ruling does not expressly
apply to a prepayment for multiple years, but since it indicates that
income will be reported in an earlier year if there is a power of with-
drawal, it seems clear that the Commission contemplates deferring
recognition of such imputed income until it is actually applied
against the premium cost as long as no power of withdrawal exists.
Depreciation. In light of my discussion of annuities and prepaid
21. Rev. Rul. 65-199, 1965-2 C.B. 20, 20.
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expenses, it should be clear that some form of accelerated deprecia-
tion is an accurate reflection of the portion of the cost of an asset
attributable to the exhaustion of a year of the asset's useful life.
Blum objects to dividing an asset into temporal segments and to allo-
cating the asset's cost according to the discounted value of the antici-
pated income stream for each segment because he believes that
different discount rates must be employed for each temporal divi-
sion. I have already dealt with that contention in my discussion of
annuities. 22
Apparently recognizing that the decline in value of an asset over
a one-year term is not a proper means to measure the allowable
amount of depreciation, Blum offers an alternative explanation for
sinking-fund depreciation - an explanation he describes as "equally
persuasive. ' '23 Depending upon one's viewpoint, Blum's explanation
might be described as equally unpersuasive. His alternative expla-
nation is that sinking-fund depreciation takes into account the im-
puted interest on a taxpayer's right to the remaining years of the
asset's income stream. Blum describes that "imputed interest" as a
lost opportunity cost of the taxpayer - specifically, he states that
"[i]n the machine situation the interest factor reflects the loss of in-
come which could have been earned by the businessman (at an as-
sumed fifteen percent rate) had he elected to invest in another
comparable opportunity. The key to the sinking-fundprincple in all
such situations is imputation of interest. 24
I have difficulty comprehending Blum's extraordinary concept
that there is an imputation of interest on a currently unproductive
asset simply because the taxpayer could have invested his capital
elsewhere. If interest were imputed in such cases, the doctrine of
realization would be a dead letter. If an accrual method taxpayer
purchases unimproved and unproductive land which he holds in an-
ticipation of appreciation in value, no interest will be imputed to him
because he could have invested his capital in productive property.
To take an example closer to the depreciation issue, if Y (an accrual
method taxpayer) were to purchase a remainder interest in an in-
come producing building subject to a five-year term, the value of Ys
remainder interest (without regard to market conditions) will in-
crease each year by virtue of the increased proximity of his posses-
sory interest. This constant increase in value constitutes unrealized
appreciation and is not reportable by Y as current income. For
22. See text at notes 7-11 supra.
23. See Blum, supra note 1, at
24. Id. at 1182 (emphasis in original).
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Blum to describe this appreciation as imputed interest is peculiar in
that it does not bear the usual characteristics of interest. Interest is a
payment for the use of funds. While the value of Ys interest does
rise by predictable percentages, there is no payment to Y (imputed
or otherwise) for the use of Ys funds.25 If Y does have imputed
interest, who is the payor? Note that this situation is easily distin-
guishable from the circumstance of the prepaid fire insurance premi-
ums, for in that case it is possible to impute an interest payment from
the insurance company to the taxpayer who purchased the fire pro-
tection.
If, as previously suggested, the purchase of an asset is properly
characterized as the purchase of temporal segments, then the value
of future segments will increase each year as the taxpayer's right to
the income for such years is nearer to realization. Blum asserts that,
even taking a temporally segmented approach, the taxpayer should
offset the unrealized appreciation of the right to the future income
stream (which he designates as imputed interest income) against the
deduction allowable for the cost incurred in purchasing the income
stream for the year for which his tax return is filed. Whatever argu-
ment there might be for requiring cash method taxpayers to report
accrued interest income on annuities or prepaid expenses, there is no
reason to require any taxpayer - regardless of his reporting method
- to report the unrealized appreciation on his right to income that
may be earned in a future year. Thus, while there is a strong case for
accelerating cost recovery in reporting income from annuities and
prepaid expenses, the case for accelerated depreciation is even
stronger. Accelerated depreciation rests not on cash method report-
ing (which Blum describes as essentially a practical accommoda-
tion), but rather on the doctrine of realization - which is an integral
part of our tax system.
Conclusion
The case for accelerated cost recovery reporting is powerful. It is
especially convincing when determining permissible methods of de-
preciation. Once one concludes that accelerated depreciation is con-
sistent with tax neutrality, the propriety of recapture of depreciation
rules and of other tax rules that deal harshly with those who employ
accelerated depreciation is cast into doubt. The principal point of
my recent article is that accelerated depreciation is no less tax neu-
tral than straight line depreciation and certainly no less neutral than
25. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 51-53.
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sinking-fund depreciation. Congress's choice of the permissible
methods of depreciation therefore should turn exclusively on policy
considerations. When weighing factors in deciding whether to adopt
an accelerated cost recovery method, characterizing such a method
as a tax preference or subsidy tips the balance against that method; it
will be adopted only where competing economic policy considera-
tions are of sufficient magnitude to override the possible inequity of
a tax preference. At present, economic policy probably compels the
granting of an even more accelerated rate of depreciation than cur-
rently allowed regardless of tax neutrality issues, but that may not
always be the case. In striking the balance for or against the acceler-
ation of capital recovery, so-called tax "subsidy" questions should be
cast aside as irrelevant except perhaps for the most extreme forms of
acceleration.
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